Ukraine’s Victories May Become a Problem for the US

Comment

Another major victory for Ukraine in the war against Russian aggression is the liberation the Kherson without any hard urban battle. Yet that triumph was met with mixed messages from US President Joe Biden’s administration on a very sensitive subject: whether the Ukrainians should begin peace negotiations with Russia.

General Mark Milley (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) suggested that the Kyiv government seek a solution before the conflict escalates to a deadlock like World War I. Others argued that Washington would not force Volodymyr Zelenskiy, the Ukrainian president, to negotiate or make concessions. “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine,” Biden pledged.

It was a rare display of rhetorical messiness by a relatively disciplined administration, which reflects real uncertainty about four critical questions — not least of which is whether a long war strengthens or weakens the US.

Russian forces in Kherson were exposed for months. There were 20,000 troops occupying a fragile beachhead on right bank Dnipro River. This is near where it flows into Black Sea. The Ukrainians attacked, using US-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems as well as other weapons to eliminate those forces and then launching a systematic offensive. The Russians couldn’t sustain their position forever; they withdrew in early November rather than have the isolated, ill-supplied units captured or destroyed.

It was one of many victories by Ukraine in September. Other notable events include the liberation of large areas of territory near Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine and the dismantling of the Karch Bridge connecting Russia to Crimea. But if the Biden administration seems suddenly conflicted about the course of the war, that’s because several key challenges are looming.

First, does Ukraine have the potential for further gains? Or is there a permanent deadlock? On the one hand, the liberation of Kherson has brought Ukrainian forces within HIMARS range of Russia’s remaining supply lines into Crimea, while troops freed up by this victory can prepare for new offensives elsewhere.

On the other hand, Ukraine’s battle-bruised army may need a rest. It could also be subject to stiffer resistance from Russian forces, who may increase their numbers through an influx conscripts, reduce their supply lines, prepare trenches or other layered defenses, and dig in for the colder weather ahead. The Ukrainians have been a surprise to many skeptics in the past. The next steps may be more difficult, however, given the fact that they have pushed Russia out of its most vulnerable position.

What is the likelihood of escalation in the second? Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons against five areas he illegally annexed in 2014. Ukraine has ignored the red lines in eastern Ukraine, Kherson, and other areas. Yet Crimea is more central to Putin’s narrative of Russian resurrection; its loss could undermine his political prestige more seriously than any prior reversal. So recent events haven’t fully quieted those within the administration who think an imperfect peace may be preferable to even a slight risk of catastrophe.

Third, how will the pro Ukraine coalition stay together? European allies are generally solid. Ukrainian victories likely ensured international support during the winter. Candid observers such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledge that Putin has not shown any interest in compromise.

Yet Biden’s team still aims to avoid a scenario in which Ukraine is seen to be blocking diplomacy as Europe — deprived of Russian energy supplies — suffers an economically punishing winter. The White House may also be concerned about what a Republican-led House of Representatives will mean for America’s position on Ukraine aid come next year.

The administration asked Zelenskiy not to reaffirm his earlier statements that Ukraine would only negotiate and deal with Russia’s next leader. This was a clear indication of why Zelenskiy had made regime change in Moscow a Western war goal. Ukraine must show it is open for negotiations if it hopes to win the war.

What does a protracted conflict do for the US? Washington may have benefited from the strategic benefits of this war, even though it has brought terrible costs to Ukraine. Russia’s military is being reduced to rubble. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is strengthening and expanding its defenses. China is being faced with greater resistance in Western Pacific. Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Australia are increasing their military readiness.  European nations are now reconsidering their ties and rethinking their dependence on Beijing, as they see the negatives of relying on one dictatorial autocracy. Amid Putin’s serial struggles in Ukraine, assertive authoritarianism no longer looks like the wave of the future.

But key officials are still unsure if the US has already enjoyed all the benefits of the Ukraine war. As time passes, the cost may get higher — in distraction from other regions, in scarce munitions consumed, in vulnerability to crises that break out elsewhere.

There are also countervailing factors: A long war which exposes the utter inefficiency of the US defense industrial base could force the country to seriously consider rearmament. Still, if the situation in the Taiwan Strait is deteriorating as rapidly as American officials say, then the premium on ending the Ukraine  conflict relatively soon may get higher.

Of all the debates and dilemmas lurking behind the recent talk about negotiations, perhaps the most pressing is the fear that Washington just doesn’t have all the time in the world.

Bloomberg Opinion: More from This Writer

• America Can Contain China With an Alliance of FiveHal Brands

• If China Invaded Taiwan, What Would Europe Do?: Hal Brands

• Can the US Take on China, Iran and Russia All at Once?Hal Brands

This column is not intended to reflect the views of Bloomberg LP or its owners.

Hal Brands writes for Bloomberg Opinion. The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, he is co-author, most recently, of  “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China” and a member of the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board. 

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